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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently decided its first public school stu-
dent free speech case in nearly twenty years.1  In that nineteen-year 
period, the lower courts diverged greatly on the issue of off-campus 
student speech.  Where one court might hold that Internet-related 
student speech should be restricted, another court looking at the 
same set of facts but applying a different standard might hold that the 
same Internet-related speech should be protected.2  As a result of the 
increasing use and prevalence of digital technology, students are now 
being punished for expression that would have previously escaped 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, Marquette University Law School.  The author would like to thank 
his wife, Katharine LaLonde, for her help, support, and comments on earlier drafts of 
this Note, as well as the American Constitution Society for Law and Public Policy for af-
fording him this opportunity. 
 1 The Court decided Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), nineteen years after Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  Although the exact parameters of student 
free speech rights are unclear, the rights of children are not necessarily coextensive with 
those of adults.  See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“It does 
not follow . . . that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be 
prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same lati-
tude must be permitted to children in a public school.”).  The Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that “the government has a right to protect children outside school from ex-
posure to certain kinds of expression.”  Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the 
Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1071 (2008); see, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
638 (1968) (holding that it was constitutionally permissible for New York to restrict mi-
nors’ access to sexual written or visual materials while allowing the same materials to be 
sold to adults). 
 2 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse 
Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 542 (2000) (describing inconsistent 
lower court opinions in the area of student free speech). 
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the attention of school officials.3  Despite an amicus brief from the 
National Association of School Boards asking for the Court to provide 
guidance on how a public school should balance students’ free 
speech rights with discipline, safety, and effective learning, the Morse 
v. Frederick decision shed little light on how far the school’s authority 
extends beyond its borders.4  Therefore, the important question of 
the constitutionality of a school’s decision to punish a student for 
speech that does not occur on campus or at a school-sponsored event 
remains disturbingly unanswered.5 
In the forty years since Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District,6 the Court’s seminal free speech case regarding stu-
dents, many courts have become increasingly deferential to the deci-
sions of school administrators.7  These courts routinely ignore or 
conduct a strained analysis of the standard articulated in Tinker, rely-
ing on overbroad readings of post-Tinker cases like Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser,8 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,9 and now 
Morse.10  In May 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
handed down a strained interpretation of Supreme Court precedent 
in Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II).11 
Part II of this Note discusses the few Supreme Court cases that 
have directly dealt with free speech in public schools to provide a 
framework for analysis of Doninger II.  Part III discusses the Doninger II 
court’s decision and rationale.  Part IV argues that the decision 
presents a dangerous application of the case law that needs to be 
reassessed and clarified.  Part IV argues that the Second Circuit mi-
sinterpreted and misapplied Supreme Court precedent and lower 
 
 3 See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1037 (commenting that a result of the digital age is that 
“adults can see what minors are saying much more easily”). 
 4 See Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 45, 46 (2008) (arguing Morse provided little guidance to school administra-
tors and leaves many unanswered questions as to which viewpoints are permissible); see al-
so Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1028 (arguing the Morse Court missed the opportunity to 
clarify whether public schools have the authority to restrict student speech off campus). 
 5 See Garnett, supra note 4, at 46 (describing the outcome and potential impact of Morse). 
 6 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 7 See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 528 (pointing out that since Tinker, “schools have won 
virtually every constitutional claim involving students’ rights”). 
 8 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 9 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  Scholars have referred to these three cases—Tinker, Fraser, and 
Kuhlmeier—together as the “Tinker trilogy.”  Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet:  
Student Speech and the First Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 356 (2007).  Dickler argues that 
the lower courts’ confusion over the application of the Tinker trilogy “has caused many 
inconsistent opinions, and in some cases, arguably unconstitutional results.”  Id. 
 10 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 11 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007). 
June 2010] PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ PATERNALISM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1419 
 
court decisions by developing and relying upon an erroneous stan-
dard.  The Part then discusses the problems that such a flawed deci-
sion creates due to its potential wide-ranging applications.  Instead, 
all district courts should reject overbroad readings of the Supreme 
Court precedent because they essentially permit limitless restrictions 
on students’ freedom of expression. 
This Note concludes, in Part V, by advocating for courts to adopt a 
narrow, objective test for defining whether off-campus speech meets 
Tinker’s “substantial and material disruption” standard.12  Such an ob-
jective test should place a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutio-
nality on the school, thereby making the school prove that its puni-
tive decisions were more than arbitrary or retaliatory.  Because 
certain areas of this topic have been extensively explored elsewhere,13 
this Note will not delve into the problematic topic of off-campus 
speech that could be deemed cyber-bullying, harassing, or threaten-
ing to the health and welfare of other public school students or offi-
cials. 
II.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT:  TINKER AND ITS NARROW 
EXCEPTIONS 
Tinker, the typical starting point for any discussion of student 
speech, upheld the Tinker children’s right to wear black armbands in 
 
 12 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 13 For a discussion of these types of off-campus speech, see Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Pub-
lic Schools in a Post-Columbine World:  Check Your Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 
77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (2000) (arguing that constitutional rights are routinely 
trampled in public schools, “largely out of a combination of fear, ignorance and self-
preservation on the part of [school] administrators”); David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of 
Student Internet Speech:  The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Colum-
bine, 2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 201 (arguing that “[s]tudent Internet speech cases 
present the courts with an opportunity to safeguard the protections of the First Amend-
ment in the face of vanishing student rights and a fear of new technology”); Robert D. Ri-
chards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout:  The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold 
in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2003) (concluding that while “student 
speech rights are under almost constant assault today, voices of reason still exist among 
the judiciary to check over-zealous educators in their efforts to quash violent, offensive 
and otherwise disagreeable expression”); Sandy S. Li, Note & Comment, The Need For A 
New, Uniform Standard:  The Continued Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 65 (2005) (“Courts must ensure that Internet-related student speech will re-
ceive some form of protection, because the Internet is a unique medium . . . .”); Lisa M. 
Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones:  A First Amendment Framework for Educators Who 
Seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 640 (2000) (addressing “student 
threats against teachers, schools, or fellow students, and the First Amendment issues that 
may arise as educators struggle to deal with these threats”). 
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school to protest the Vietnam War.14  The majority famously wrote 
that while students may not have the same rights as adults, they do 
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate.”15  The opinion went on to warn that 
schools may not seek to impose conformity such that they become 
“enclaves of totalitarianism” bent on “foster[ing] a homogenous 
people.”16  In order to prevent such totalitarianism, absent a “specific 
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, 
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.”17  The 
Court found no “actual or nascent” evidence that the on-campus ac-
tions of the Tinker children interfered with “the schools’ work or of 
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let 
alone.”18  The Court held that only student speech that “materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is . . . not immunized by the constitutional guarantee 
of freedom of speech.”19  In other words, the Court established a two-
prong standard:  schools can only abridge on-campus student expres-
sion if the activity materially or substantially interferes with—or is rea-
sonably certain to interfere with—the work and discipline of the 
school or will result in substantial disorder or the invasion of the 
rights of others.20 
While the Court did not define how or when its materially and 
substantially interfere test would be met, many commentators have 
written that the test is strictly limited to in-school activity.21  For ex-
 
 14 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).  While Tinker is the typical starting point for student speech 
discussions, it was not the first Supreme Court case to address the issue.  For example, in 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court wrote that because schools “are edu-
cating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach 
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”  319 U.S. 
624, 637 (1943).  However, before Tinker, it was not a foregone conclusion that public 
school students had any affirmative free speech rights.  Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights 
Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2009) (citing Richard L. 
Berkman, Students in Court:  Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America, 40 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 567, 568–69, 580 (1970)). 
 15 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added). 
 16 Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)). 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 508. 
 19 Id. at 513. 
 20 Id. at 512–13. 
 21 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment:  Censorship of the Emerging 
Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 271 (2001) (arguing the Tinker Court 
never suggested a limitation to students' speech rights outside the school setting or that 
schools could punish off-campus expression that did not reach the confines of campus); 
Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights:  The Need for an Enhanced First 
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ample, the majority defined the purpose of schools in very narrow 
terms by stating that “[t]he principal use to which the schools are 
dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for 
the purpose of certain types of activities.”22  Commentators have criti-
cized subsequent decisions for being poorly reasoned and for consis-
tently siding with the schools,23 thereby eroding many of the protec-
tions provided by Tinker.24 
Nearly two decades after Tinker, the Supreme Court seemingly re-
versed course in Fraser.25  Fraser’s school suspended him and pre-
vented him from speaking at graduation as a result of a sexual in-
nuendo-filled speech given at a school assembly.26  The majority 
narrowed the scope of students’ constitutional rights by stating that 
“the constitutional rights of students in public school are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”27  
The Court noted, “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular 
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced 
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”28  After conducting such 
a balancing test of Fraser’s right to freedom of expression with the 
school’s duty to protect and teach civility to its students, the Court 
upheld the school’s restriction of his speech.29 
The Court’s opinion stressed that unlike the Tinker children’s 
armbands, Fraser’s speech was not of a political nature.30  Rather, the 
 
Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 135 
(2007) (arguing Tinker narrowly defined the purpose of schools and does not expressly 
extend to off-campus speech). 
 22 Markey, supra note 21, at 135 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512). 
 23 See Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student 
Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 840 n.26 (2008) (listing law review articles dis-
cussing the confusing nature of Supreme Court precedent in this area). 
 24 Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 528. 
 25 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 26 Id. at 677–78, 687.  Fraser gave this speech in front of his fellow high school students.  
The speech was as follows: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his charac-
ter is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.  
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he’ll 
take an issue and nail it to the wall.  He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives 
hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.  Jeff is a man who will go to 
the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you.  So vote for Jeff for 
A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school 
can be. 
  Id. at 687. 
 27 Id. at 682. 
 28 Id. at 681 (emphasis added). 
 29 Id. at 685. 
 30 Id. 
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Court looked to the importance of schools teaching students the 
proper bounds of socially acceptable “habits and manners of civili-
ty.”31  Chief Justice Burger wrote that “vulgar speech and lewd con-
duct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public 
school education”32 and that the objective of public education is the 
“inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of 
a democratic political system.”33  To properly educate students on 
these fundamental values, the Court felt that schools needed the 
right to regulate and control student expression inconsistent with its 
basic mission.34 
Although the Court did not overrule or alter the rule outlined in 
Tinker, the majority ignored Tinker’s contention that an “undifferen-
tiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression.”35  The opinion significantly 
shifted the burden by calling for courts to defer to the decision of 
administrators when deciding whether the questioned speech had 
caused or would cause a substantial and material disruption.36  In 
other words, the Fraser opinion suggests that judges can and should 
make judgments about the relative importance of the speech at issue 
when deciding such cases.37  The Court held that it was not only ac-
ceptable at times, but also highly appropriate, for public schools to 
“prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”38  
Significantly, under Fraser, the vulgarity and offensiveness of speech 
depends on the effect on the reader or hearer, rather than on the 
message as it is “objectively read or heard.”39 
However, Justice Brennan’s concurrence significantly questioned 
the scope of the opinion.40  In his concurrence, Justice Brennan em-
phasized that the Court’s holding concerned only a school’s authority 
to restrict a student’s use of disruptive language in a speech given to a 
 
 31 Id. at 681. 
 32  Id. at 685–86. 
 33 Id. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)). 
 34 Robert E. Simpson, Jr., Limits on Students’ Speech in the Internet Age, 105 DICK. L. REV. 181, 
188 (2001). 
 35 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 36 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 37 Id. at 680-81; see also Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 839 (suggesting the Court dis-
tinguished Fraser from Tinker without explicitly altering or adding to Tinker's holding). 
 38 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 39 Paul J. Beard II & Robert Luther III, A Superintendent’s Guide to Student Free Speech in Cali-
fornia Public Schools, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 381, 396 (2008). 
 40 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688–89 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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school assembly.41  In addition, Justice Brennan pointed out that the 
majority’s opinion suggested, “[i]f [Fraser] had given the same 
speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized simply because government officials considered his lan-
guage to be inappropriate.”42 
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court 
upheld a high school principal’s decision to censor school-sponsored 
student newspaper stories dealing with topics such as teen pregnancy 
and the impact of divorce.43  The decision made a distinction between 
a school’s requirement to tolerate unpopular speech and a school af-
firmatively promoting a viewpoint with which it disagrees by again 
pointing out that the speech at issue was not political speech like that 
involved in Tinker.44  Like Fraser and contrary to Tinker, the Court held 
that schools are not constrained by the First Amendment and may 
limit on-campus student speech, regardless of whether a substantial 
interruption is likely to occur, as long as the decision is “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”45 
However, the Kuhlmeier court qualified the scope of its holding by 
specifically stating that its application was limited to “educators’ au-
thority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, 
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of 
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.”46  The qualification of the holding specifically indicates that a 
school’s decision to punish off-campus student speech does not fall 
under this narrow exception to Tinker.  Therefore, schools must have 
a stronger rationale than merely the existence of a “reasonable rela-
 
 41 Id. (holding the government could not punish speech merely because it considered the 
speech inappropriate). 
 42 Id. at 688 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
 43 484 U.S. 260, 260, 263 (1988). 
 44 Id. at 270–71.  Some commentators disagree with the assertion that Kuhlmeier narrowed 
the holding of Tinker.  For example, Bruce C. Hafen argues that “rather than weakening 
the Court’s commitment to the constitutional rights of students, [Kuhlmeier] seeks to 
strengthen students’ fundamental interest in the underlying principles of free expression:  
the right to develop their own educated capacity for self-expression.”  Bruce C. Hafen, 
Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 
685.  While Hafen’s argument may have been what the Court intended at the time, lower 
courts have not applied the holding in this manner in the intervening two decades.  See 
infra Parts III, IV. 
 45 Kuhlmeier, 260 U.S. at 272–73. 
 46 Id. at 271.  Further evidence of the Court’s intention to narrow the scope of its holding is 
its statement that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 
‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not censor similar speech 
outside the school.”  Id. at 266 (citation omitted). 
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tion to legitimate pedagogical concerns” for punishing such off-
campus speech.47 
The confusing nature of the Court’s holdings dealing with public 
school speech remained until Morse v. Frederick.48  In Morse, a high 
school punished Frederick for unfurling a seemingly nonsensical 
banner stating “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored outing 
to watch the passing of the Olympic torch.49  Although this case pre-
sented the Court with its first opportunity to allow freedom of student 
expression off campus, it declined to limit the scope of schools’ au-
thority to the “schoolhouse gate.”50  Instead, the Court specifically re-
jected Frederick’s contention that the speech occurred off campus 
and therefore should not have been restricted.51  Most significantly 
for other instances of student expression that occur outside of the 
schoolhouse gate, the Court also rejected the school’s assertion that 
schools are broadly allowed to punish speech they deem offensive.52  
The majority rejected such an expansive reading because it “stretches 
Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech 
that could fit under some definition of ‘offensive.’”53 
Instead, the Court analyzed the facts of the case and held that the 
speech at issue could be restricted because it occurred at a school-
sponsored event, could reasonably be attributed to the school, and, 
most significantly, advocated use of illegal drugs.  The Court held 
that “schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care 
from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal 
drug use”54 because such a message is “clearly disruptive of and incon-
sistent with the school’s educational mission to educate students 
about the dangers of illegal drugs and to discourage their use.”55 
However, Justice Alito’s concurrence, which Justice Kennedy 
joined, significantly narrowed the Court’s holding to speech concern-
ing non-political and non-social issues.56  Justice Alito wrote that the 
opinion did not authorize any restrictions on student speech other 
 
 47 Kuhlmeier, 260 U.S. at 273. 
 48 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 49 Id. at 397–98. 
 50 Id. at 405–06. 
 51 Id. at 400. 
 52 Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 855. 
 53 Morse, 551 U.S. at 409; see also Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 856; Markey, supra note 
21, at 139. 
 54 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 55 Id. at 399. 
 56 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).  The Morse decision was narrowed because the majority 
needed Alito and Kennedy’s votes to obtain a majority. 
June 2010] PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ PATERNALISM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1425 
 
than those of the Tinker trilogy and certainly did not warrant censor-
ship of any student speech “that interferes with a school’s ‘education-
al mission.’”57  Although the concurrence allowed censorship of Fre-
derick’s message because it advocated illegal drug use, Justice Alito 
made explicitly clear that such regulation “stand[s] at the far reaches 
of what the First Amendment permits.”58 
None of these Supreme Court cases discusses the amount of defe-
rence that lower courts should give to schools’ increasingly frequent 
decisions to punish a student’s “offensive” comments that are initially 
made off campus but eventually find their way on to campus.  Courts’ 
rulings on this issue continue to vary.59  Unfortunately, strained inter-
pretations of the Constitution and precedent have appeared with in-
creasing frequency in recent years.60  These cases misapply precedent 
and often improperly extend the application of Fraser and Tinker by 
relying on a paternalistic approach to minors. 
III.  DONINGER V. NIEHOFF FACTS AND COURT OPINIONS 
A.  Facts 
On April 24, 2007, Avery Doninger, a junior at Lewis Miller High 
School (LMHS) in Connecticut, and other members of the LMHS 
Student Council fought with school administration over the third re-
scheduling of “Jamfest,” an annual battle of the bands extracurricular 
event.61  In response to the rescheduling, Doninger and three other 
Student Council members sent an email from a school computer to 
members of the community asking for help in convincing the admin-
istration to hold the event as originally scheduled.62  The email stated 
that “[r]ecently the Central Office decided that the Student Council 
could not hold its annual Jamfest/battle of the bands in the audito-
 
57  Id. at 423.  Justice Alito worried about the application of the Court’s holding because 
  [t]he “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the elected and ap-
pointed public officials with authority over the schools and by the school administra-
tors and faculty.  As a result, some public schools have defined their educational mis-
sions as including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held by 
the members of these groups. 
Justice Alito specifically stated that such broad applications of the Court’s opinion should 
be rejected.  Id. 
 58 Id. at 425. 
 59 See infra Parts III & IV. 
 60 See infra Parts III & IV. 
 61 Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 
199 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 62 Id. at 44. 
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rium” and asked that the recipients “forward [the email] to as many 
people as [they] can.”63  Specifically, the email requested that the re-
cipients contact Paula Schwartz, the district superintendent.64  The-
reafter, Karissa Niehoff, the Principal of LMHS, had a discussion with 
Doninger regarding her disappointment that the students had not 
come to her with their concerns.65  The district court found that the 
influx of emails and calls that resulted from the students’ mass email 
caused Niehoff and Schwartz to miss or be late to several school-
related activities on April 24th and April 25th.66 
On the evening of April 24, 2007, Doninger posted a blog message 
on an independently operated, publicly accessible website that was in 
no way affiliated with LMHS.67  The post began as follows: 
[J]amfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office.  here [sic] is 
an email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to 
everyone in their address book to help get support for jamfest [sic].  bas-
ically [sic], because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of 
phone calls and emails and such.  we [sic] have so much support and we 
really appreciate [sic] it. however [sic], she got pissed off and decided to 
just cancel the whole thing all together.  anddd [sic] so basically we 
aren’t going to have it at all, but in the slightest chance we do it is going 
to be after the talent show on may [sic] 18th. andd..here [sic] is the letter 
we sent out to parents.68 
The blog post attached the letter the four student council members 
sent to members of the community earlier in the day.69  The post then 
reproduced an email that Doninger’s mother sent to the school ad-
ministration in order to give others an “idea of what to write if you 
want to write something or call her to piss her off more.  im [sic] 
down.”70  Other LMHS students responded to the post by calling 
Schwartz a “dirty whore” and calling for a “sit-in.”71 
The following morning, members of the school administration re-
ceived more phone calls and emails and called a meeting with the 
students who had sent the original email.72  During this meeting, ad-
ministrators and the student council amicably resolved the dispute 
 
 63 Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I), 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 64 Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 44. 
 65 Id. at 45. 
 66 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 206. 
 67 Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 45. 
 68 Id. at 45. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. at 51. 
 72 Id. at 45. 
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and settled on a date for Jamfest.73  To notify students and parents of 
the dispute’s resolution, Niehoff published the new date of Jamfest in 
the school newsletter, and the four student council students notified 
recipients of the email sent on April 24, 2007.74 
Weeks later, well after the dispute had already been settled, the 
school administration found out about Doninger’s blog post.75  In 
fact, during court testimony, Schwartz admitted that “some days after 
the meeting,” her adult son found the blog post while conducting an 
Internet search for Avery Doninger.76  Schwartz’s son made the dis-
covery and gave it to his mother, who alerted Niehoff to the finding 
on May 7, 2007.77 
On May 17, 2007, Niehoff called a meeting and confronted Do-
ninger with a hard copy of the blog post.78  At the meeting, Niehoff 
asked Doninger to apologize to Schwartz, show the entry to her 
mother, and “recuse herself from running for reelection” as class sec-
retary.79  Doninger readily complied with the first two requests, but 
refused to withdraw her candidacy.  The administration thus declined 
to endorse Doninger for the position and refused to put her name on 
the ballot.80  Niehoff testified that she punished Doninger for three 
reasons:  (1) her use of vulgar language; (2) her “failure to accept 
[her] prior suggestions regarding the proper means of expressing 
disagreement with administration policy and seeking to resolve those 
disagreements,”81 and (3) her decision to provide the blog’s readers 
with inaccurate information about Jamfest.82 
Despite not being on the ballot, Doninger garnered a plurality of 
the votes in the election through the write-in process.83  However, the 
administration barred Doninger from taking her position and from 
speaking at graduation.84  In response, Doninger’s mother alleged a 
violation of her daughter’s First Amendment right to free speech and 
sought an injunction voiding the election.85 
 
 73 Id.   
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 46. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81  Id. at 208. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 46–47.   
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B.  The Strained Interpretations of the District Court and the Second Circuit 
The district court began its opinion by discussing Tinker, Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse.86  The court then looked at precedent and ana-
logized the facts of Lowery v. Euverard87 to those of the Doninger case.88  
In Lowery, a group of football players circulated a petition calling for 
the removal of their coach and were subsequently suspended from 
the team.89  The players contested their exclusion from the team.90  
The Lowery court held that “[p]laintiffs’ regular education has not 
been impeded, and, significantly, they are free to continue their 
campaign to have Euverard fired.  What they are not free to do is 
continue to play football for him while actively working to undermine 
his authority.”91  The district court quoted the above passage with ap-
proval and stated that, “Avery does not have a First Amendment right 
to run for a voluntary extracurricular position as a student leader 
while engaging in uncivil and offensive communications regarding 
school administrators.”92 
The court then went on to state that while it believed the facts to 
be closer to those of Fraser than Tinker,93 it looked at and applied the 
Second Circuit’s recent precedent of Wisniewski v. Board of Education.94  
Wisniewski involved an eighth-grade student who sent instant messag-
es from his home computer to a number of school friends that con-
tained an image of a pistol firing a bullet at the head of their English 
teacher, Mr. VanderMolen, and stating “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”95  
The icon came to the attention of school officials when a student, 
who had not received a message from Wisniewski, pointed out the 
icon to the administration.96  Subsequently, the police and school 
psychologist both determined that Wisniewski had no intention of 
carrying out any such threat and only meant the icon as a joke.97  De-
spite these findings, the superintendent suspended Wisniewski for 
one semester for the violation of a student handbook provision that 
 
 86 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 211–15. 
 87 497 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 88 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 215–16. 
 89 Id. at 215 (citing Lowery, 497 F.3d at 599–600). 
 90 Lowery, 497 F.3d at 600. 
 91 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 92 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 216. 
 93 Id. 
 94 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 95 Id. at 36. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
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forbade threats against school teachers and for creating a disruption 
of the school environment.98 
The Wisniewski court agreed with the school’s punishment and 
found that Wisniewski’s actions created a substantial and material dis-
ruption of the school environment.99  Although the speech at issue 
occurred off campus, the court ruled that Wisniewski was not im-
mune from school punishment because it was “reasonably foreseea-
ble” that the speech would find its way to the school, come to the at-
tention of the authorities, and substantially and materially disrupt the 
administration of the school.100  The court went on to find it irrele-
vant that the icon was determined to be a joke because schools “have 
significantly broader authority to sanction student speech than the 
[Supreme Court’s] standard allows.”101  Because the speech did, in 
fact, reach the school, the court did not rule on whether it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that the speech would come to the attention of 
school officials.102 
The Doninger I district court then rejected Doninger’s contention 
that the holding of Wisniewski should be limited to the Tinker frame-
work and not Fraser.103  The court found that the blog constituted on-
campus speech and could be punished under the exception outlined 
in Fraser because its content “was related to school issues, and it was 
reasonably foreseeable that other LMHS students would view the blog 
and that school administrators would become aware of it.”104  The dis-
trict court then ruled against Doninger on the merits.105 
On appeal, Doninger argued that the school could not regulate 
her speech because it occurred squarely within the confines of her 
own home and did not create a reasonably foreseeable risk of sub-
stantial disruption of the school environment.106  The school, on the 
other hand, asserted that in Wisniewski, the Second Circuit had impli-
citly affirmed that schools can punish off-campus speech that they 
deem offensive if the speech is likely to come to school authorities’ 
attention.107 
 
 98 Id. at 37. 
 99 Id. at 38–39. 
100 Id. at 39. 
101 Id. at 38. 
102 Id. at 40. 
103 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 216 n.11 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
104 Id. at 217. 
105 Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. at 199. 
106 Id. at 49. 
107 Id. at 50. 
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The court of appeals rejected a bright-line territorial approach 
and implicitly relied heavily upon Fraser's ruling against plainly of-
fensive speech.108  The court then rejected the school’s broad reading 
of Wisniewski, yet affirmed that a student may be disciplined for off-
campus speech that “foreseeably create[s] a risk of substantial disrup-
tion within the school environment” when the speech may also fore-
seeably reach campus.109  The court reasoned that if Doninger’s 
speech had occurred on campus, the language chosen would have 
fallen squarely within Fraser, and authorities could have prohibited 
the speech to discourage the future use of similar inappropriate lan-
guage.110 
The court of appeals held that the case’s facts satisfied Tinker and 
Wisniewski for three reasons.  First, Doninger’s choice of words satis-
fied Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard and disrupted efforts to re-
solve the ongoing dispute.111  The court cited other students’ reac-
tions to the post, placing special emphasis on the student who called 
Schwartz a “dirty whore,” as evidence that Doninger’s “efforts to re-
cruit could create a risk of disruption.”112 
Second, the court asserted that the “at best misleading and at 
wors[t] false” information provided by Doninger in the blog post led 
to a substantial disruption in the form of a “deluge of calls and 
emails” that caused Niehoff and Schwartz to be late to school-related 
activities.113  The court stated that Doninger’s blog post posed a “sub-
stantial risk that LMHS administrators and teachers would be further 
diverted from their core educational responsibilities.”114 
Finally, the court stated that extracurricular activities are a privi-
lege and attempted to justify the school’s actions by analogizing the 
facts to those of Lowery.115  In the Second Circuit’s estimation, the 
school’s actions could be understood as upholding school policy that 
a “student who does not maintain a record of [good] citizenship may 
not represent [the student body].”116 
 
108 Id. at 49. 
109 Id. at 48 (citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
110 Id. at 49. 
111 Id. at 50–51. 
112 Id. at 51. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 52. 
116 Id. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
There are three main problems with the Second Circuit’s opinion 
in Doninger II.  First, the opinion improperly, implicitly extends Fraser 
to off-campus speech.  Second, the Second Circuit rests heavily on 
flawed reasoning, misstatements of precedent, and faulty analogy to 
support its proposition that Tinker does not require an actual showing 
of disruption.  Third, the application of the decision could have wide-
ranging effects in other off-campus student speech cases.  This sec-
tion concludes by discussing the need for a clearer framework for 
cases involving off-campus Internet speech and the problematic ap-
plication of cases like Doninger. 
A.  An Improper Application and Extension of Fraser 
While Doninger’s blog post may be characterized as plainly offen-
sive by some, such language was not threatening and is often heard 
on primetime television shows.117  In fact, Merriam-Webster’s Colle-
giate Dictionary defines “douchebag,” the ostensibly offensive lan-
guage used by Doninger, as a slang term for “an unattractive or offen-
sive person.”118  Assuming arguendo that such speech is vulgar, it still 
cannot be subjected to school sanction because the speech was 
created and accessed off campus.119 
In addition, like the Fraser Court, the Doninger II court rationalized 
that the school is responsible for teaching students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior.120  The Second Circuit used Fraser to 
justify the punishment because of that opinion’s suggestion that 
judges can and should make judgments about the relative impor-
tance of the speech at issue when deciding such cases.121  In Fraser, 
Chief Justice Burger wrote that “vulgar speech and lewd conduct is 
 
117 Popular teenage shows, such as Family Guy and South Park, routinely air such language.  
For example, South Park aired an episode entitled “Douche and Turd” before the 2004 
presidential election.  South Park:  Episode 119 (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 
27, 2004).  In the 2006 season of Family Guy, the term was often used, including in the 
season finale, where the President of the United States’ name was “Douchebag.”  Family 
Guy:  Episode 30 (FOX television broadcast May 21, 2006). 
118 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 348 (10th ed. 1993). 
119 Brief of Amicus Curiae, ACLU of Connecticut, in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 
2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) (No. 3: 07-cv-1129). 
120 Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 48. 
121 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680–81 (1986); see also Denning & 
Taylor, supra note 23, at 840 (arguing the Supreme Court suggested administrators and 
judges can make judgments about the relative importance of speech when it distin-
guished the Tinkers' political acts from Fraser's speech). 
1432 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:5 
 
wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school 
education” and that the objective of public education is the “incul-
cat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system.”122  The Second Circuit, however, broa-
dened the scope of Fraser beyond the Court’s intent of allowing 
schools to punish on-campus speech that is threatening or highly of-
fensive.  Nowhere in the Fraser opinion does the majority extend a 
school’s right to punish students for offensive and lewd behavior to 
non-disruptive off-campus speech, regardless of its lewdness or vulgar-
ity.123  Rather, the opinion’s emphasis on venue124 implies the exact 
opposite.125 
Moreover, the Second Circuit failed to cite or adhere to Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Morse, which clarifies that school officials do 
not have “unfettered latitude to censor student speech under the ru-
bric of ‘interference with the educational mission’ because that term 
can be,” and indeed was in Doninger’s case, “easily manipulated.”126  
Furthermore, it is inappropriate to have judges “who are removed 
from popular teen culture” decide what off-campus speech can be 
considered lewd or indecent, as these standards constantly evolve.127 
The notion that schools play an important social role in protect-
ing minors from sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech does not 
apply to a blog that is written and accessed exclusively off campus.  
Such a rationale cannot be used for punishment because it fails un-
der all three of Tinker’s narrow exceptions.  Unlike Fraser’s speech, 
Doninger’s blog post occurred off campus and did not take place at a 
school assembly.  Unlike Kuhlmeier’s newspaper, members of the 
general public could not reasonably perceive the blog post to bear 
the school’s imprimatur.  Unlike Morse’s banner, the blog post did 
not promote the use of illegal drugs.  These exceptions are the only 
ones carved out of the Tinker standard by the Supreme Court and 
stand at the “far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”128  All 
 
122 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 685 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)); see 
Garnett, supra note 4, at 52–53. 
123 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 119, at 4. 
124 The statement “[a] high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit 
monologue” implies a geographic limitation to the Fraser holding.  See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
685. 
125 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 119, at 4 (arguing the Supreme Court did not intend 
for Fraser to apply to off-premises speech). 
126 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)). 
127 Li, supra note 13, at 101. 
128 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
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other restrictions of student speech should be presumptively uncons-
titutional.  Even accepting the school’s premises for punishment as 
truth, in this instance only Doninger’s parents should have the right 
to punish her for inappropriate language and non-constructive 
means of resolving a dispute because Doninger wrote the “offensive” 
post entirely off campus and did not access the site using school 
property. 
Lastly, the facts of this case are more analogous to Tinker because 
the blog post—while arguably containing inappropriate language—
was essentially political speech made while off campus.  The blog post 
can be characterized as political speech in that it criticized the actions 
of those in authority, the school administrators, for a governance de-
cision, the postponement of Jamfest.  Unlike the sophomoric assem-
bly speech given by Fraser, Doninger’s blog post regarding her disa-
greement with school administration is essentially political speech 
and cannot and should not be equated with cases dealing with van-
dalism129 and threats to school personnel.130 
Arbitrary actions such as those of Niehoff and the school adminis-
tration instead accomplish the exact opposite of their intent.  One 
commentator notes that “[a]llowing the marketplace of ideas to flou-
rish at school and on the Internet helps prepare students to be partic-
ipants in democracy that cherishes the free exchange of ideas and di-
versity of viewpoint.”131  The administration’s voiding of a democratic 
school election, which Doninger won through a write-in campaign, 
teaches students never to voice their opinion, never to attempt to 
mobilize their peers around what they may see as an erroneous or un-
just administrative decision, and never to disagree with authority fig-
ures in any manner.  Such a message is contrary to the spirit of Fraser 
in that it does not inculcate the “fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system.”132 
 
129 See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998) (denying injunc-
tion to student expelled for publishing an article on how to hack into the school's com-
puters in an underground school newspaper). 
130 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding 
the school's decision to punish a student for creating and transmitting a drawing depict-
ing the shooting of a teacher). 
131 Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1078. 
132 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 
441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)). 
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B.  Faulty Analysis of Tinker’s “Material and Substantial Disruption Test” 
This case and others like it improperly extend the bounds of Tink-
er beyond what was intended by the Supreme Court.  A student does 
not abandon her First Amendment rights merely by attending public 
school and discussing school-related topics or activities while off 
campus.  Tinker was not meant to apply outside of the schoolhouse 
gate, as its holding readily indicates.  However, even if Tinker did ap-
ply that broadly, Doninger’s blog post did not satisfy Tinker’s re-
quirement for a material and substantial disruption of the school en-
vironment.133 
Contrary to the statements of administrators, the blog post did not 
threaten to disrupt ongoing efforts to resolve the dispute because the 
dispute was resolved the very next day.  In fact, the blog post may 
have helped speed up the resolution of the dispute.  One could argue 
that the increased number of calls and emails received from con-
cerned parents and students—that may or may not have been a result 
of the blog post—could have led to a more rapid resolution of the is-
sue than would have otherwise occurred.  This “undifferentiated risk” 
of possible disruption of the school environment never rose to the 
level of being “substantial” because the school did not cancel any 
classes and did not have to expend any additional resources to inves-
tigate any sort of threat, and no student undertook disruptive action 
or behavior in response to either the blog post or email.  Like Tinker, 
although the students were a bit “riled up,” no sit-in took place and 
no other disruptive behavior occurred.  Rather, in order for a rea-
sonable jury to find a material and substantial disruption, “the disrup-
tion would have to be so severe as to cause, or to threaten to cause, 
consequences such as class cancellations, widespread disorder, vi-
olence, or student disciplinary action, or to render teachers ‘incapa-
ble of teaching or controlling their classes.’”134  Doninger’s blog post 
did nothing of the sort and therefore fails under Tinker. 
The court also failed to address a major inconsistency in Donin-
ger’s situation.  Although the school punished Doninger for the blog 
post, the majority of the disturbance occurred as a result of the on-
campus email.  While the school could clearly punish Doninger and 
the other students for their initial email because of the use of school 
equipment,135 she received no repercussion for this action.  Instead, 
 
133 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
134 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 119, at 10 (citing Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 
136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001)). 
135 Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007). 
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the school punished her exclusively for the blog posting.  The court 
realized the weakness of this argument and attempted to justify this 
position on the basis that Niehoff and Schwartz were late to a few 
meetings.136  However, receiving calls from parents and other con-
cerned citizens on a matter of both school and community impor-
tance is an essential part of a school administrator’s position.  The 
court should not have allowed this poor excuse to justify the school’s 
punishment of a student expressing views that the Court did not sup-
port. 
In addition, Doninger should not have been punished for the 
words used and actions threatened by other students.  If Doninger 
had used the word “douchebag” to describe a student, rather than 
the administration at large, it is highly unlikely that she would have 
been stripped of her nomination to run for student council.  
Schwartz’s actions suggest that she and her son were on the hunt for 
Avery Doninger and no one else.  The court conveniently ignored the 
fact that the dispute had been easily defused and resolved weeks prior 
to Doninger’s punishment.137  In this light it becomes clear that Do-
ninger’s punishment was an act of retribution.  Such a witch hunt 
should not be sanctioned and justified by the judicial system on false 
pretenses.  Instead, had the court conducted a proper Tinker analysis, 
it would have found that the blog post did not substantially disrupt 
classroom activities and that Niehoff was merely punishing Doninger 
because she did not like what Doninger had posted on the website.  
Such an action is an inappropriate and unacceptable justification for 
limiting student speech under Tinker, Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School 
District,138 Layshock v. Hermitage School District,139 and Justice Brennan’s 
concurring opinion in Fraser.140  
Furthermore, both the district court and the Second Circuit twist 
and misconstrue the holdings of other courts to support the proposi-
tion that Tinker does not require an actual showing of disruption.  
The cases cited by the Second Circuit do not support its argument in 
that the cases deal with speech that occurs or is disseminated at 
school or school-sponsored extra-curricular activities,141 or involve an 
 
136 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d at 41. 
137 See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 45. 
138 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that a student could not be punished 
for a website created off campus). 
139 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that a student’s free speech rights were 
violated when he was suspended for creating an online parody of the school’s principal). 
140 478 U.S. at 688–89 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
141 See Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 
No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008)), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 
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explicit or implicit threat to a student or faculty member.142  The dis-
trict court’s opinion, for example, cites four cases for the proposition 
that the school committed no violation of the student’s First 
Amendment rights under Tinker.143  Ironically, all four of these cited 
cases hold the exact opposite.  Although all of the cases apply Tinker 
to off-campus speech, the cited cases all failed Tinker’s material and 
substantial disruption test, and these courts overturned the students’ 
punishments.144 
Finally, both the district court and court of appeals used a false 
analogy between the facts of Doninger and Lowery.145  In Lowery, the 
players circulated a petition and specifically brought and intended 
the petition itself to come onto campus.146  Doninger’s speech, on the 
other hand, occurred entirely off campus, and the language used in 
the blog—at the very least, one factor for which the school punished 
Doninger—was not designed to come on to campus.  Therefore, the 
language used in the post should not have been used as a factor—in 
fact, it seemed to be the strongest factor—in Doninger’s punishment. 
If the administration had truly punished Doninger for the blog 
post’s use of inappropriate language, her punishment should have 
been the same as if she had said the same word while on campus.  Al-
though the post advocated on-campus action, the language itself was 
not designed to come onto campus and represents the real reason for 
Doninger’s punishment.  It is highly doubtful that use of one foul 
word permanently strips a student of school privileges, especially in 
light of the fact that the case does not mention that the school doled 
 
2007); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing article printed in 
a student newspaper and distributed at school); Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 
F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing petition circulated by members of the football 
team while at school). 
142 See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 51 (citing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th 
Cir. 2001)). 
143 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 216–17 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d at 41. 
144 See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (holding that there was no nexus between the speech 
and any substantial disruption of the school environment because no classes were can-
celled, no widespread disorder occurred, and the only in-school conduct was the showing 
of the website to other students); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. 
Mich. 2002) (holding that the punishment was unconstitutional because there was no 
evidence that the speech interfered with the work of the school or impinged on the rights 
of students); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 (W.D. Pa. 2001) 
(holding that a document did not disrupt school or interfere with anyone’s substantial 
rights); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
(awarding preliminary injunction where punishment for derogatory language on a per-
sonal website likely demonstrated First Amendment harm). 
145 See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 52; Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 215–16. 
146 Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585–86. 
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out any punishment to the student who called Niehoff a “dirty 
whore.”147  Although Niehoff listed other, pedagogical reasons for de-
nying Doninger the right to run for student council,148 such reasoning 
came from the benefits of hindsight and legal coaching.  It is much 
more plausible that Doninger received punishment merely because 
the administration disagreed with and took offense to her blog post.  
Such capricious actions by school officials merely because they dislike 
a student’s speech should not be judicially condoned. 
The Doninger court’s reasoning also rests on a flawed analogy in 
that the Lowery court wrote that the players were free to continue 
their campaign to have Euverard fired, but were not free to play foot-
ball for him while actively seeking to undermine his authority.149  Do-
ninger, on the other hand, was not “engaging in uncivil and offensive 
communications regarding school administrators”150 at the time of 
her punishment.  Rather, as Niehoff requested, she had already apo-
logized for the language used and any disturbance caused and had 
discussed the situation with her mother by the time the student 
council election took place.  Unlike the situation in Lowery, where 
Euverard reinstated the football players who apologized to him,151 
Niehoff refused to allow Doninger to run for student council despite 
the apology.152  As a result, the Second Circuit not only applied, but 
rather extended the holding of out-of-circuit precedent as one of the 
strongest rationales for its denial of Doninger’s First Amendment 
rights.  The use of this out-of-jurisdiction precedent relying on a 
flawed analogy suggests that the court was merely looking for a ratio-
nale to justify the school’s punishment of Doninger. 
C.  The Reason to Care:  The Potential Wide-Ranging Effects of the Decision 
The Doninger case raises the question of how this important, albeit 
flawed, decision will be applied by public secondary schools and uni-
versities.  The Doninger decision implies that any criticism or foul lan-
guage that occurs off campus is punishable once, and no matter how, 
it is communicated to the school administration.  This decision sets a 
dangerous precedent by essentially permitting administrators to con-
duct limitless, “random” Internet searches whose results can be used 
 
147 See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 51. 
148 Id.  at 46. 
149 Lowery, 497 F.3d at 600. 
150 Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 216. 
151 Lowery, 497 F.3d at 586. 
152 See Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207. 
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to punish students who have voiced their displeasure with school ad-
ministration while off campus.  If this holding is not clarified or 
reigned in, other courts could reasonably interpret Doninger as allow-
ing school officials to randomly search the Internet for evidence that 
could be used to justify punishment any time that a school official has 
a problem with a student.153  While schools are not to be totalitarian 
enclaves “bent on foster[ing] a homogeneous people,”154 decisions 
such as Doninger make it difficult to discern the difference because 
they allow schools to punish students for any speech that the school 
deems as creating even a remote risk of disruption. 
In addition, the decision presents a new, problematic way of look-
ing at the Internet as a weapon rather than a positive teaching tool.  
Most importantly, the current forms of digital expression that occur 
via email, text message, and instant message are no different from the 
protected speech that occurs at malls, movie theaters, or other public 
venues where students congregate.155  However, the court essentially 
disregarded the territorial argument (in-school versus out-of-school) 
and allowed school administration to successfully claim that the In-
ternet is always “in-school” and disruptive if its content is communi-
cated to the school in any manner whatsoever.  This interpretation of 
Doninger poses extremely wide-ranging effects because such a broad 
definition of on-campus speech would erase any boundary between 
on-campus and off-campus speech.  Such a distinction would deter 
students from making any reference to school administration, teach-
ers, or fellow students.156  Moreover, by affirming retributive actions 
by school administration, students learn to be apathetic to decisions 
of the administration, for voicing one’s opinion results only in pu-
nishment and loss of privileges.  The increased tattling, retaliation, 
and petty disturbances that would result from such an application of 
Doninger would detract much more from the schools’ educational 
missions than the use of a single inappropriate word used in a blog 
post. 
 
153 Similarly, Papandrea criticizes the Wisniewski decision for many of the same reasons, stat-
ing that: 
[p]ermitting school officials broad authority to punish student speech whenever it 
comes to their attention would grant them the power to punish students who en-
gage in a political protest in the town square, write a letter to the editor in the lo-
cal newspaper, or simply speak to their friends while walking around the mall. 
  Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1092. 
154 Garnett, supra note 4, at 53 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
506 (1969)). 
155 Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1036–37. 
156 See Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 882. 
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In our current, digital age, such situations will likely arise with in-
creasing frequency.  Instead of condoning actions like those of 
LMHS, courts need to understand that digital technology plays a vital 
and critical role in the social and cultural development of teenagers 
in that it allows and fosters self-expression, self-realization, and self-
reflection.157  Rather than classifying Internet-related student speech 
as always occurring on campus, courts should ensure that such 
speech receives some form of protection because “the Internet is a 
unique medium, offering anonymity and allowing people to easily 
exchange ideas at the click of a button.”158  In today’s increasingly 
technological age, teachers and administrators should expect to read 
and hear student criticisms of their actions and should not punish 
the opinions unless they truly cause a material and substantial disrup-
tion of the school environment.  The expansion of school jurisdic-
tional authority that Doninger represents is disturbing because fun-
damental, constitutional rights are at issue.  Although extracurricular 
activities may be a privilege, they should not be arbitrarily taken away 
by thin-skinned administrators because such punishment represents 
another form of censorship. 
Most importantly, free speech is a core value of our democratic 
society and should be protected at all costs.  The Beussink court cor-
rectly highlighted the importance of this issue by reasoning that: 
  One of the core functions of free speech is to invite dispute.  It may 
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to 
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging . . . . 
  Indeed, it is provocative and challenging speech . . . which is most in 
need of the protections of the First Amendment.  Popular speech is not 
likely to provoke censure.  It is unpopular speech that invites censure.  It 
is unpopular speech which needs the protection of the First Amendment.  
The First Amendment was designed for this very purpose.   
  Speech within the school that substantially interferes with school dis-
cipline may be limited.  Individual student speech which is unpopular 
but does not substantially interfere with school discipline is entitled to 
protection.   
  The public interest is not only served by allowing [such] message[s] 
to be free from censure, but also by giving the students . . . [an] oppor-
tunity to see the protections of the United States Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights at work.159 
 
157 See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1032–34. 
158 Li, supra note 13, at 67. 
159 Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 1175, 1181-82 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1440 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:5 
 
Given the increasing prevalence of cases like Doninger, the Su-
preme Court should clarify some of the underlying assumptions of 
Tinker and Fraser and restrict their application to speech conducted in 
school or at school-related or school-sponsored events.  Failure to 
uphold free speech outside of public schools leaves students with no 
adequate means of preventing a violation of their First Amendment 
rights by school personnel. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  DONINGER HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR A CLEARER 
FRAMEWORK 
The problems and inconsistencies of the Doninger opinion and its 
possible far-ranging effects make evident that the courts need a clear-
er standard to determine when a student can be punished for off-
campus Internet speech.  While other commentators have proposed 
solutions to the problem, none of the proposals go far enough to un-
equivocally cover speech such as Doninger’s.  For example, Sandra Li 
advocates that “[t]he Tinker standard is the most applicable standard 
for internet-related student speech cases that do not involve school 
sponsorship, because it is both broad and flexible enough to balance 
the needs of a student’s right to self-expression and the school’s need 
to maintain an orderly and safe educational environment.”160  The 
Doninger opinion, however, highlights the need for a more protective 
standard by showing just how willing courts are to bend Tinker in such 
a way as to justify a school’s action. 
Justin Markey proposes a slightly different standard to determine 
whether speech should be classified as on-campus or off-campus 
speech, thereby determining the amount of constitutional protection 
afforded the expression.161  Markey believes that Internet speech 
should be classified as off-campus if it was created “independent of 
school activities, independent of the school’s resources, and [it] is 
not a true threat.”162  He argues that a school district should not be 
constitutionally allowed to punish the student for such speech “unless 
the student intentionally or recklessly caused the speech to be distri-
buted on campus.”163  While fitting for the majority of cases, this stan-
dard does not go far enough in that it may not afford Doninger’s 
speech any protection. 
 
160 Li, supra note 13, at 102. 
161 Markey, supra note 21, at 149–50. 
162 Id. at 150. 
163 Id. 
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Off-campus criticism of school officials and administrative deci-
sions, even using vulgar and profane language, should be constitu-
tionally protected unless the student intentionally causes the vulgar 
language itself to be distributed on campus.  That is, a student should 
not be punished merely for calling a teacher or administrator a vul-
gar name on the Internet.  In addition, students should not be pu-
nished merely because the administration finds out about the post 
and the advocated action occurred on campus.  Such an action would 
discourage all active and inactive disagreement with school adminis-
trators. 
Rather, while it is necessary to balance the competing interests of 
the school with the free speech rights of the student,164 the courts 
should place a presumption of unconstitutionality on the censorship 
of off-campus student speech even before conducting a Tinker analy-
sis.  Similar to Markey’s standard, the first question that should be 
asked in situations involving the censorship of student Internet 
speech is whether the speech occurred on or off campus.  If the 
speech itself occurred or was distributed on campus, courts should 
then proceed with a Tinker analysis.  However, if the speech occurred 
off campus, the final inquiry should be whether the speech at issue 
constituted a threat.  If so, courts should continue to defer to the de-
cisions of school administration in order to protect students and fos-
ter a positive learning environment.  However, if the speech cannot 
be said to be a threat, the next inquiry should be whether the speech 
itself was designed to substantially and materially disrupt the school 
or interfere with the rights of other students at school.  If not, then 
the questioned speech cannot constitutionally be censored.  This fi-
nal step is of utmost significance because if courts proceed directly to 
Tinker, as Markey proposes, situations like Doninger can easily be ma-
nipulated post hoc by the school to justify their punishment of any 
student for voicing displeasure with administrative decisions. 
Therefore, as long as no threats are made and no harassment oc-
curs that could reasonably spill over and result in substantial disrup-
tion within the school environment, Internet use at home should be 
beyond the reach of school regulation regardless of the offensive na-
ture of the language used.  A rebuttable presumption of unconstitu-
tionality should result for non-threatening, non-harassing speech that 
is created off campus on the student’s own property, not during 
school hours, and for which there exists no evidence that the material 
was accessed on school property, regardless of the type of punish-
 
164 Id. at 151. 
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ment meted out by school administration.165  Schools should only be 
able to rebut this presumption by affirmatively proving a material and 
substantial disruption under Tinker.  Undifferentiated fears cannot 
and should not qualify to disregard a student’s constitutional rights.  
Judges should not merely defer to and affirm the decisions of school 
administrators.  While a school district’s motive to prevent disruption 
of the school environment that would hinder the learning process is 
clearly a legitimate goal, it does not outweigh students’ off-campus 
constitutional rights.  In this manner both interests can be met; 
schools can ensure the safety of their students and the spirit of the 
Constitution can be fully respected to prevent schools from becoming 
“enclaves of totalitarianism” bent on “foster[ing] a homogenous 
people.”166 
 
165 Not all commentators agree that off-campus speech should not be subject to school cen-
sorship.  See, e.g., Renee L. Severance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the 
Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2003) (ex-
amining and criticizing the use of the “geographic distinction of speech—that is whether 
the speech occurred on campus or off campus—as a bright-line boundary to school juris-
diction with respect to Internet speech”). 
166 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
